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Associative thinking: A Deleuzian perspective on social dreaming  
Julian Manley 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Social dreaming is a way of thinking. As soon as we accept this from the beginning 
we can work towards creating a theory of the phenomena of social dreaming which 
takes us away from the distraction of the idea of the dream as being in some sense a 
mystifying and/or mystical abstract representation of something which is so ineffable 
and confusing that it might as well be nothing. The purpose of this chapter is to 
reassess the nature and validity of the thoughts emerging in dreams that are shared in 
the context or container of a social dreaming matrix, and in doing so create a theory of 
social dreaming, or at least to make a start in this direction. Long (in this volume) and 
Long and Harney (2013), focus on a semiotic approach that takes as its basis the 
philosophy of Charles Peirce applied to social dreaming, including his theories of 
abductive reasoning, and sign-vehicles. However, in this chapter I want to concentrate 
on the use and meaning of the term “association” in the context of social dreaming. 
Long and Harney (ibid) have also noted the importance of associative thinking to 
social dreaming and have coined the useful term “associative unconscious” to 
describe a key feature of the thinking process in psychosocial thinking or 
socioanalysis. The theory of social dreaming that I wish to pursue in this chapter 
concentrates on this aspect of social dreaming, not so much on the dreams themselves 
within the matrix as individual objects or signs to be shared by the participants in 
social dreaming, but the gaps in between, the links, connections and relationships that 
are developed through associative thinking that lead to the transformation of the 
dreams from single objects into living processes that constitute thinking: moving 
fragments of thought in constant flows of never-ending incompletion.  
 
Thought as process 
One of the difficulties of understanding and using social dreaming lies in our attitude 
towards what constitutes a valid or “objective” thought. The reductionism associated 
with many traditional forms of scientific enquiry, with their roots in Cartesian 
approaches to thinking renders the thought processes of social dreaming unusable due 
to the impossibility of paring away the meaning from the multiple possibilities that 
dreams contain both within themselves as individual dreams and, even more so, as a 
complex collage of inter-connected and multi-faceted dream images. The meaning of 
a dream is notoriously difficult to be certain about. The very nature of dreams, 
through what Freud dubbed “condensation” (Freud, 1953 pp. 279-305) is opposed to 
the thought process that would wish to slice away superfluous material and eliminate 
ambiguity to reach for clarity of meaning: to be able to say “this means that” in a 
manner of thinking that closely resembles Cartesian patterns of cause and effect. A 
contrary process governs the meaning of the collected dreams in a social dreaming 
matrix. Understanding is embedded within the accumulated contents of the dreams 
and associations as they are shared in the matrix. Its sense reveals itself periodically in 
spontaneous moments of affective intensity and in conjunction with other meanings 
within the same matrix by the ways each participant in a matrix perceives or rather 
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intuits the developing collage of associations that form as the matrix proceeds. And 
once formed, such meanings may dissolve in order to create further or other 
meanings, which may then dissolve or remain or mutate into further thoughts and 
feelings as the process of accumulation of dreams continues in the matrix. As a 
process, the meanings are therefore never static but always on the move.  
 
When the matrix is over, the multitude of meanings are still in flux, even if they are 
stilled temporarily by a different process, that of the “Dream Reflection Dialogue”, or 
another more cognitive reflection that might take place after the matrix. In the Dream 
Reflection Dialogue, the “reverie” (Bion 1970) of the matrix is replaced with a more 
conscious state of reflection that brings us back into a mode of thinking that we are 
more used to in our day-to-day activities. In this second stage process, the matrix 
becomes a group that begins an interpretative process by sharing and contrasting 
personal sense-making with other people’s experiences of the dreams in the matrix. In 
this stage of thinking, the multifarious thoughts, images and feelings of the matrix are, 
to a certain extent at least, distilled, channelled and categorised into thoughts that can 
be taken away and used. In Bion’s language (ibid), the Beta elements of unprocessed 
thoughts of the matrix are being transformed into Alpha elements which can then 
become part of the stuff of daily life. Due to the inherent complexity of the dreams, 
associations and the way these are weaved together in the matrix, some Beta elements 
will remain, and yet more will be in limbo as thoughts that are both emerging and yet 
to emerge. There is never a completely rounded and definitive solution to the 
problems raised in the matrix. There are only ways forward and new insights that can 
be taken away and applied to each individual’s relationship with and understanding of 
her social environment. 
 
Understanding meaning as process rather than an end is, therefore, an essential 
element of this theory. This is not necessarily an easy way of considering thought, 
since it challenges a scientific way of thinking that prizes logic and rationality above 
all other thought. However, neither is this attitude completely new. Wittgenstein 
famously concluded that words were limited in their expression and sometimes 
became “language games” when they reached the limits of the rational. In discussing 
“language games”, Wittgenstein emphasised the special “game” of dreaming; how 
dreams bring us to the limits of language and reasoning through language by 
presenting impossibilities or absurdities together in images: 
 
What this language primarily describes is a picture. What is to be done with the picture, how 
it is to be used is still obscure. Quite clearly, however, it must be explained if we want to 
understand the sense of what we are saying. But the picture seems to spare us this work: it 
already points to a particular use. This is how it takes us in. 
(Wittgenstein 1953, p. 157) 
 
Susan Langer’s seminal work, Philosophy in a New Key (1948), also pointed to the 
special “meanings” that could only be transmitted through the arts: 
 
Really new ideas have their own modes of appearance in the unpredictable creative mind. (p. 
164) 
  
These “really new ideas”, do not, according to Langer, emerge from the use of 
language, which is the instrument of reason: 
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Language, in its literal capacity, is a stiff and conventional medium, unadapted to the 
expression of genuinely new ideas, which usually have to break in upon the mind through 
some great and bewildering metaphor. (p.164) 
 
The clue that links this to social dreaming is the idea of new ideas emerging from 
metaphor. There is no sense to much of the social dreaming matrix except through a 
poetic sensitivity to metaphor or figurative language in general, for the dream is better 
understood in this way. For Langer, it is not language but music, in its non-
representational expression that brings the individual closer to emotion. Indeed, there 
is a certain musicality to the expression of dreams in the matrix. Just as music is 
understood through the interconnectivities between the notes, so too do the dreams 
make sense through the way the social dreaming matrix allows for interconnectivity 
between them. In music, we may not be able to give meaning to the notes (with some 
exceptions, as for example programme music, there is no clear meaning to music) but 
we nevertheless react and respond and gain an affective understanding of sorts; so too 
in social dreaming. We have therefore alternative ways of approaching knowledge, as 
long as we understand that the use of language in the matrix is figurative in nature and 
affective in quality.  In other words, although we inhabit a world of knowledge-
making in social dreaming, it is a form of cognition that is not subject to the rules of 
language in its “literal capacity”.  
 
This alternative way to knowledge has been the subject of other thinkers’ 
preoccupations in recent years, not related to social dreaming but nevertheless 
relevant. Some have sought to demonstrate how cognition needs to be understood as 
more than what emerges from the rational brain (LeDoux 1998; Damasio 2000); that 
cognition should include information that is harnessed through its embodiment in the 
being, including the nervous system (Varela et al 1993; Nuñez & Freeman 1999); 
through sensitivity to understanding through affect (Damasio 2003); and even through 
a sense of our inter-relationality with our environment. (Roszak, Gomes & Kanner 
1995) Even some branches of post-modern continental philosophy, especially in the 
work of Gilles Deleuze, question the primacy of logic and elevate the value of 
creativity. For Deleuze, a primary function of the philosopher is the creation of new 
concepts, which is why his philosophical works often seem to border on the 
metaphorical or creative (Deleuze & Guattari 1994). Similarly, Deleuze’s world of 
created concepts consists largely of a panorama – or in his words a “rhizome” on a 
“plateau” - of affect that moves thinking away from cognition and towards intensities 
of affectivity in a Spinozian sense of the word (Deleuze & Guattari 1988; Deleuze 
1988). It is these kinds of processes that make up the collage of multi-layered 
meanings that are embedded in the images of the social dreaming process, meanings 
that are communicated through what I have previously dubbed “image-affects” 
(Manley 2009). 
 
If, then, the language of social dreaming - its dreams and associations - is indeed that 
of created thoughts and figurative language, embodiment and affect, our approach and 
attitude towards the knowledge within the social dreaming experience cannot be that 
of the habitual and rational. It is at this point, therefore, that I return to an approach 
based on the understanding that associative thinking can bring to social dreaming. 
 
Associative thinking 
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The use of free association in dream work comes, of course, from Freud’s dictum to 
his patients that: 
 
We therefore tell him that the success of the psychoanalysis depends on his noticing and 
reporting whatever comes into his head and not be misled, for instance, into suppressing an 
idea because it strikes him as unimportant or irrelevant or because it seems to him 
meaningless 
(Freud 1953 p. 100). 
 
A version of this process is in play in the social dreaming matrix. Instead of 
interpreting the meaning of a dream, a participant in the matrix will either offer 
another dream that seems somehow (inexplicably perhaps) related, or offer a 
spontaneous association to another’s dream, where the connection might be as 
implicit as explicit. This is done without attention to rational or logical thought, and 
with no desire for overt meaning making. The connection between this mode of 
proceeding - which, in Freud’s case, was about unearthing the repressions that prevent 
a patient from leading a healthy life - and the creation of new thoughts first emerged 
in André Breton’s artistic circle of surrealists in the early twentieth century. Instead of 
focussing on the dyadic relationship between analyst and analysand and the clinical 
repression of the latter, Breton’s group would use associative techniques such as  
“automatic writing” and the “automatic message” in an attempt to avoid what they 
understood as being strictures of standard thought and to allow creativity to freely 
emerge into new patterns of expression. The “automatic messages” included 
illustrations, while “automatic writing” concentrated on words, and the combination 
shows the emphasis this technique placed on the visual (Breton 1933 [1997]; Breton 
and Soupault 1920 [1997]), just as dreams may begin as a narrative but often end up 
being remembered for their visual impact.  The results of automatic writing can often 
sound like dreams: 
 
I leave the halls of Dolo with grandfather very early in the morning. The kid would like a 
surprise. Those halfpenny cornets have not failed to have a great influence on my life. The 
innkeeper’s name is Tyrant. I often find myself in this beautiful room with the volume 
measurements. The coloured reproduction on the wall is a reverie that always makes a 
reappearance… 
(Opening to “Seasons” in Breton and Soupault ibid, p. 67) 
 
A similar process of associative thinking in the social dreaming matrix is what creates 
new thoughts, these being one of the stated objectives of the matrix. There is a link, 
therefore between associations and creative thinking. Because these associations exist 
in the context of social dreaming, there is also a link between the social and 
associative thinking. For some social scientists, this link is what brings them to 
question the very nature of the social. In the case of Bruno Latour, for example, the 
word ‘social’ needs to be reconfigured as “association”. In trying to redefine 
sociology, Latour struggles with terms such as “sociology of associations” and wishes 
he could use the term “associology” (Latour 2005, p. 9). What Latour is attempting is 
a new, contemporary and more valid understanding of the word “social” as being 
equivalent to or better expressed as a network of associations that, like the 
associations in social dreaming, are in a constant state of flux. For Latour, the word 
“social” has outlived its usefulness. It has been transformed into a restricted object 
that is used to define a thing that does not really exist: 
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What is called “social explanation” has become a counter-productive way to interrupt the 
movement of associations instead of resuming it.’ 
(ibid p. 8) 
 
In a way that reminds me of social dreaming, Latour suggests that the rigidity of 
“explanation” actually removes the flowing, multi-faceted layers of meaning that 
come with the “movement of associations”. In social dreaming, this would be the way 
that interpretation would interrupt the movement of images, thoughts and feelings of 
the dreams and associations by giving meaning or explanation which would foreclose 
further meaning-making by reducing its sense to a particular moment in the matrix. 
By doing so, the potential for the dream or association to influence the development 
of meaning after the foreclosure of interpretation is stymied and the very nature of 
this process of knowledge creation is curtailed. This is why an experienced host (the 
word for “facilitator” in social dreaming) in a social dreaming matrix will do 
everything in her power to provide working hypotheses, (as opposed to hypotheses to 
be tested and proved), instead of interpretations. As has been explained elsewhere - 
see Lawrence (2005 pp. 35-37) for an initial definition; Long and Harney (2013) for a 
discussion informed by Peirce - the working hypothesis opens out a sense of fluid 
meaning- making that constitutes the very essence of the social dreaming process. 
Another way of understanding the function of the working hypothesis is through 
associative thinking. That is to say, the reason the hypothesis is a working one that 
has no intention of being proved is because it recognises that a particular collage of 
associations of a given moment – the one of the hypothesis - is only the prevalent 
sense of the matrix at a particular time that also recognises the shifting nature of these 
associations in a future time of the matrix process.  
 
It should be pointed out that Latour’s ideas in this regard are not completely new. He 
supports his “associology” with thoughts from the work of semi-forgotten philosopher 
Gabriel Tarde, pointing out the vital importance of inter-relationality and movement 
in Tarde’s work. For Tarde, the social “was not a special domain of reality but a 
principle of connections… sociology was in effect a kind of inter-psychology” and was 
even described as “circulating fluid” (Latour 2005, p. 13). In social dreaming, the 
dreams and associations can also usefully be described as a circulating fluid, and their 
associative strength is partly based on the maintenance of this fluidity. A working 
hypothesis that might be offered by a host in the social dreaming matrix facilitates 
fluidity by emphasising the links and connections of the flow of associations rather 
than stemming them through a series of interpretations. To offer interpretations would 
be like constructing a series of dams or weirs in a flowing stream. 
 
A heterotopian collage of image-affects 
The image of the flowing stream is not, however, complete as a description of the 
flow of association in the social dreaming matrix. Returning to Tarde, we are 
reminded that the fluidity is circulating. This in turn reminds us of another feature of 
the associative thinking in the matrix, that of the tendency of the associations to 
become linked through randomly created connections between the dreams and 
associations. The associations are not inter-connected solely through a sense of a 
linear passing of time, and the result is not merely a straightforward sequence of 
ideas. It is unlike a flowing stream. Instead, such associations are often created 
spontaneously as a result of the many multilayers of imagery that exist within each 
dream. Associations then begin to emerge and become relevant in unexpected ways in 
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the course of the matrix as a whole. An image from a dream may be more relevant to 
another dream or association that might occur at any point in the matrix including a 
point that is far removed from its immediate sequentiality. The following example, 
taken from Karolia and Manley (forthcoming 2018) illustrates this. In this social 
dreaming matrix, hosted in the context of the Muslim community in England, my 
colleague and I were seeking to understand how British Muslims felt about their 
Muslim and British identities in the wake of terrorist attacks in Europe. Each 
intervention is signalled by a dash. The line numbers of the transcript indicate the 
sequences and the jumps: 
 
9         - I had another dream, we were at the train station, and then I got lost and   
10  then some old lady came and she goes are you alright and then and then I was  
11 ducking away from the cops and I found my sister. 
12 - I had a dream that I bought a really expensive pair of shoes and they got  
13 stolen, before I could even wear them. 
14 - I had a dream, that I was in jail, and then I smashed the wall and I escaped. 
I  
15 passed out and then they put me back in jail.  
 
*** 
 
38 - I had a dream, my father’s a cop. He was in the police car, and he was  
39 driving around shooting people. I was watching a movie before I went to 
 sleep.  
40 And then the people turned into zombies. 
41 - That reminds me of when people who are terrorists they think they’re  
42 going to be in heaven, they’re like zombies 
42 - I had a dream that Donald Trump became president, scared the hell out of 
 me.  
 
A working hypothesis from these two extracts might be that for British Muslims the 
police embody fear, persecution and lack of certainty about the fairness of authority, 
as indicated by “ducking from the cops” and the impossibility of escaping from jail. 
Later in the matrix this is picked up again in the dream of the father as a cop, which 
adds a twist to the first dreams of persecution and authority, since in the latter 
example the cop is the dreamer’s father. When the figure of authority is both a 
murderous cop and a father, the fear and persecution become embodied in the figure 
of Donald Trump, the fearful authority of the “free” world. This dream was offered 
before Trump’s election to the Presidency.  
 
There may be other elements that could be suggested and deduced from the dreams to 
add to this working hypothesis, but the point I want to emphasise is that the 
hypothesis has been created by a collage of associations that is not immediately 
sequential. In order to get there, we have had to go from a sequential block of lines 9-
15 to lines 38-42. In our minds, then, these blocks are extracted from the logic of the 
time sequence of their expression (which at its most rational proceeds from line to 
line) and respond instead to another pattern of thought. Such a pattern then resembles 
more a collage of associations that is the fruit of associative thinking that emerges 
from the associative unconscious than to a rational, linear train of thought. It is up to 
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the participants in the matrix to create these patterns since they are not explicit or 
given; they are not the result of language in its literal capacity.  
 
The ensuing patterns resemble a collage of associations that has been created from the 
space of the social dreaming matrix. The creation of this collage of associations 
between the image-aeffects of the matrix is like a Foucauldian heterotopia, where 
disparate elements find form and meaning through the links and connections made by 
the participants of the matrix. It is a space of knowledge that Foucault would describe 
as an “archaeology”, that is to say an epistemology that does not rely on sequences of 
logic. Instead of this, ‘archaeology’ addresses itself “to the general space of 
knowledge, to its configurations, and to the mode of being of the things that appear in 
it (Foucault 2002, p. xxv). This is what Foucault called “the pure experience of order 
and its modes of being” (ibid, p. xxiii), where disparate elements are given sense by 
the creative will of the mind. In the social dreaming matrix this is the creative and 
shared mindset of the participants, an example of heterotopias which  
 
secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because 
they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance and not only 
the syntax with which we construct sentences, but also that less apparent syntax which causes 
words and things (next to and also opposite to one another) to ‘hold together’  
(ibid p. xix) 
 
Foucault indicates the link between such heterotopias and a surrealist way of thinking 
by using as an example a painting by the surrealist, Salvador Dalí, which is in line 
with the example mentioned above of Breton’s efforts at automatic writing.  The 
painting in question, (Sewing Machine with Umbrellas in a Surrealist Landscape’, 
(1941)), depicts an unlikely combination of a sewing machine and an umbrella where, 
“for an instant, perhaps forever, the umbrella encounters the sewing machine.” (ibid 
p. xix) Such unlikely combinations resonate with the way the dreams and associations 
in social dreaming weave, interconnect and make sense within the created space of 
the social dreaming matrix. 
 
A rhizome of associative thinking 
By moving away from a linear concept of expression towards the heterotopian space 
of the social dreaming matrix, we are able to replace linearity with what Deleuze 
called a “rhizome”. That is to say a randomly self-selecting set of interconnected 
image-affects that pulse in intensity at a given moment of perception. Instead of lines 
of thought, Deleuze and Guattari posited the concept of the rhizome to describe a 
“circulation of states” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, p. 21) that have no predestined 
direction, no centre, no hierarchy or guidance from any authority. This well describes 
both the structure of the collage of associations of the social dreaming matrix and the 
way it is created, i.e., through the unfettered, unguided expression of dreams and 
associations of the participants in the matrix, a space devoid of the authority of a 
leader (the host for example), who deliberately plays down any leadership role that 
might be expected of her in another configuration, for example that of a group. 
Instead, the dreams and associations are self-organising and create their own collages 
of potential meaning, a meaning that is constantly shifting, nevertheless, through 
connections that are intuitively made through a sense of their relative intensities of 
affect. That is to say, the language of social dreaming is predominantly visual and 
embedded in the images of the dreams is a condensation of affect that becomes 
significant to the speakers and listeners of the matrix according to how intensely they 
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are felt. In the example quoted above, therefore, the first dream is clearly not 
primarily a story about escaping the police, but rather an expression of complex 
affect: the fear that is felt in a situation that should be designed for its opposite, the 
reduction and control or containment of fear, (what cops should do). The intensity of 
this fear is increased due to the sensation of the joining of opposites through the 
image in the dream: the cop produces fear. For Deleuze, these moments of intensity of 
affect are both rhizomatic in the way they are connected, and also, they are in a state 
of constant flux.  
 
Following Spinoza, Deleuze conceived of affect as being an experience of moving 
emotions, shifting from greater to lesser according to the different configurations in 
the rhizome. Therefore, although the dream images and associations exist in the open 
once they have been expressed, they are never static expressions that are completed 
through that expression. Instead, they fluctuate or pulsate in intensity. In the example 
above, the most intense moment of affect comes in the dream of Donald Trump. Here, 
the image is not only intense in its own right; its intensity is maximised through the 
connections to deviant authority expressed in the dreams and images that resonate 
with it. It is as if the dreams of the cops, the father cop, the jail and Donald Trump all 
pulsate together in a moment of intensity that connects them as a single pattern 
despite not being connected sequentially. 
  
The role of the host in social dreaming is to support this associative thinking, contain 
the associative unconscious, and create a space of absolute freedom of movement of 
thoughts and feelings through minimum intervention in the process. This freedom of 
thought that allows for the self-organisation of affect is the same as the space Deleuze 
called “smooth space”. Deleuze distinguished this smooth space from what he called 
“striated space”, with the former allowing a complete freedom of thought, feeling and 
expression, while the latter denotes a channelled and restricted, linear mode of 
thought (Deleuze & Guattari 1988). Finally, this movement of affect through the 
smooth space of the matrix becomes what Deleuze termed “nomadic”. That is to say, 
the dreams and association of the matrix can be compared to the movement of the 
nomad: spontaneous, guided by the way and environment, living with uncertainty, 
embracing chance encounters. The dreams and associations of the matrix are thus 
expressed according to the feeling of when the moment is right. There is no turn 
taking, no guidance, no obligation to speak: things happen.  
 
Nomads of the matrix 
Taking her cue in part from Deleuze, Rosi Braidotti (2011) has centred her work on 
“nomadic theory”.  In her writings, she emphasises the positive and affirmative 
aspects of nomadic theory and contrasts this with the negative feel of dealing with 
Freudian repression as part of a psychoanalytical approach to knowledge. This echoes 
Gordon Lawrence’s refusal to interpret dreams in the social dreaming matrix. For 
Lawrence, like Bion, the unconscious was so much more than a store of potential 
repressions. Lawrence emphasised positive outcomes that emerged from the matrix 
that he described as the “infinite”, influenced by Bion and used as an alternative to the 
unconscious. Very often, then, the feeling of a social dreaming matrix is not one of 
negativity and angst, but rather a joy in infinite possibility, even when the content of 
the dreams and associations is dark or gloomy. This is close to Braidotti’s concept of 
nomadic thinking: 
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Nomadic thought rejects the psychoanalytic idea of repressions and the negative definition of 
desire as lack … It borrows instead from Spinoza a positive notion of desire as an ontological 
force of becoming. This achieves an important goal: it makes all thinking into an affirmative 
activity that aims at the production of concepts, precepts, and affects in the relational motion 
of approaching multiple others.  
(Braidotti 2011, p.2) 
 
An aspect of how this is achieved is undoubtedly the shared nature of the matrix, 
where one is able to approach multiple others. In the case of a social dreaming matrix, 
these multiple others constitute the whole of the matrix, the space where dreams are 
offered and once offered no longer belong to the dreamer. Such offerings immediately 
transfer to the heterotopian space of the matrix. As is well known in social dreaming 
circles, social dreamers are interested in the dream and not the dreamer and this is due 
to the shared nature of the matrix, which is unlike the expression of a personal dream 
in a clinical context. Within the matrix, dreams and associations are offered 
nomadically; the dreams are given as a response to the landscape created at any 
particular moment in the matrix.  
 
As part of this nomadic process, the participants in the matrix find themselves in 
states of what Braidotti, following Deleuze, calls “becoming”.  That is to say, the 
image-affects of the social dreaming matrix are not interpreted cognitively but are 
approached intuitively and affectively through a sense of empathy and attraction that 
can become so intense that each participant may feel as if she is becoming a dream or 
a dream state or embodying the affect that is contained therein. This in part explains 
the sensation that many participants in social dreaming express of surprise at not only 
finding other people’s dreams interesting but actually believing that those dreams, or 
the image-affects within them, actually feel like their own.  
 
I have previously given examples of the process and effects of “becoming” in social 
dreaming in Manley and Trustram (2016), where in a discussion of social dreaming in 
the context of a museum exhibition about the abolition of the slave trade, various 
“becoming animals” – a crocodile, then a whale – created a feeling of empathy and 
understanding for the participants of what it might have been like to be a slave in the 
hold of a slave ship. In doing so, the participants in the matrix were able to use the 
collage of dreams to create combinations that together made meanings through a 
sense of becoming the dreams that would otherwise – in a literal capacity -  have been 
difficult to comprehend: becoming slave. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this brief and incomplete theory of social dreaming I have intended to demonstrate 
how there is a need to begin with the basics of thought, the premises of what can be 
agreed is appropriate to call thinking. For this reason, I began by locating social 
dreaming ontologically in the world of embodied cognitive processes that contrast 
with a prevalent understanding of cognition as a Cartesian brain. If we are agreed that 
this mode of thinking is acceptable, then the task of understanding the nature and 
quality of the knowledge imparted in the process of social dreaming becomes clearer 
and more useful as a means of acquiring a more rounded, holistic view of the thinking 
process. This could lead to a richer understanding of the complexities of real life 
situations and consequently more effective decision-making in the context of the 
social dreaming matrix. 
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An essential part of what this different perspective of thinking entails, I have 
introduced the term “associative thinking” to describe how the emergence of thoughts 
is created in social dreaming through the links and connections between the image-
affects of the matrix rather than through interpretations of the meanings of the 
dreams. Instead of interpretations, I have emphasised the importance of the working 
hypothesis, that hints and opens out possibilities of meaning without ever foreclosing 
the potential of a dream or association to contribute to the accumulation of meaning 
that may come from making further connections with other image-affects that are 
expressed through further dreams in the matrix.  
 
The process of associative thinking of the social dreaming matrix takes place in what 
I suggest is a space of creativity that can usefully be described, following Foucault as 
a heterotopia, that is to say a space where unusual connections can be made between 
the image-aeffects of dreams which make sense in the creativity of that space by 
making connections that would otherwise seem absurd or illogical. The connections 
are between expressions of affect in a Deleuzian/Spinozian sense rather than between 
ideas, and they are formed in what Deleuze and Guattari termed a rhizome: a non-
hierarchical, self-organising, collage of interconnections between different intensities 
of affect transmitted through the dream images. The journeys of these image-affects 
into meaning emerge as a result of a freedom of movement which is facilitated by the 
nature of the social dreaming matrix as a ‘smooth space’. That is to say a space of 
unrestricted movement, which is nomad-like in the sense that it guides itself 
intuitively and according to context and the creativity of the participants in the matrix. 
Like nomads, we travel. 
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